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Curing Epidemics on Networks using a Polya
Contagion Model
Mikhail Hayhoe1 Fady Alajaji2 Bahman Gharesifard2
Abstract—We study the curing of epidemics of a network
contagion, which is modelled using a variation of the classical
Polya urn process that takes into account spatial infection among
neighbouring nodes. We introduce several quantities for measur-
ing the overall infection in the network and use them to formulate
an optimal control problem for minimizing the average infection
rate using limited curing resources. We prove the feasibility of
this problem under high curing budgets by deriving conservative
lower bounds on the amount of curing per node that turns our
measures of network infection into supermartingales. We also
provide a provably convergent gradient descent algorithm to
find the allocation of curing under limited budgets. Motivated
by the fact that this strategy is computationally expensive, we
design a suit of heuristic methods that are locally implementable
and nearly as effective. Extensive simulations run on large-
scale networks demonstrate the effectiveness of our proposed
strategies.
Index terms—Polya contagion urn scheme, epidemics on
networks, non-stationary stochastic processes, supermartin-
gales, curing strategies, gradient descent, node centrality.
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we examine the problem of curing an epidemic
using a network contagion model adapted from the Polya
process [1], [2]. Here an epidemic can represent a disease [3],
a computer virus [4], the spread of an innovation, rumour or
idea [5], or the dynamics of competing opinions in a social
network [6].
Epidemics on networks have been intensively studied in
recent years, see [7], [8] and references therein and thereafter.
Our model is similar to the well-known susceptible-infected-
susceptible (SIS) compartmental infection model [9], in the
sense that initially, all nodes may be healthy or infected and
as the epidemic spreads, nodes that are infected can be cured
to become healthy, but any healthy node may become infected
at any time, regardless of whether they have been cured
previously. However, the dynamics of the traditional SIS model
tend to be complicated, and often deterministic approximation
methods are employed to simplify the analysis [8]. In contrast
to the SIS model, our model is motivated by the classical
Polya contagion process, which evolves by sampling from an
urn containing a finite number of red and black balls [10],
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[11], [12]. In the network Polya contagion model, introduced
in [1], each node of the underlying network is equipped with
an individual urn; however, instead of sampling from these
urns when generating its contagion process, each node has a
“super urn”, created by combining the contents of its own urn
with those of its neighbours’ urns. This adaptation captures the
concept of spatial infection, since having infected neighbours
increases the chance that an individual is infected in the future.
The stochastic properties of this model were examined in [1],
[2]. In this work, we study the problem of controlling the
contagion spread under this model.
More specifically, we propose various natural ways to mea-
sure the total infection in the network Polya contagion model,
and examine conditions under which these measures have
limits as time grows without bound. Using these measures,
we pose an optimal control problem within the context of
the network Polya contagion model. As our first contribution,
we characterize lower bounds on the allocation of curing to
individual nodes which turn these infection measures into
supermartingales. Our result hence provides a conservative
strategy for curing network epidemics. We next focus on
realistic scenarios, where the curing budget is constrained. As
our next contribution, we prove that the constrained gradient
flow method is convergent for this problem and hence can
be employed to find near-optimal strategies under a fixed
curing budget at each time step. In spite of its effectiveness, as
we demonstrate, the gradient flow strategy is computationally
expensive and is only implementable in a centralized manner.
These shortcomings motivate us to look into alternative strate-
gies, which take advantage of notions of node centrality of
the underlying network along with the composition of super
urns at each time step. These strategies are less expensive
computationally and can be adopted for implementation in a
decentralized manner. Through extensive simulation results,
we show that our proposed heuristic strategies perform well
in curing epidemics.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
outlines some mathematical preliminaries that will be used
throughout the paper. Section III contains the description of
our network contagion process and the problem statement.
Section IV discusses analytical results pertaining to the control
of epidemics using this model, and Section V outlines strate-
gies used to solve the problems posed. Section VI includes
several simulation results. Finally, Section VII sumamrizes our
contributions and proposes avenues for future work.
2II. PRELIMINARIES
For a sequence vi = (vi,1, . . . , vi,n), we use the notation v
t
i,s
with 1 ≤ s < t ≤ n to denote the vector (vi,s, vi,s+1, . . . , vi,t),
with vti,0 = v
t
i . Our technical results rely on notions from
stochastic processes, some of which we recall here. Through-
out, we assume that the reader is familiar with basic notions
of probability theory.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, and consider the
stochastic process {Zn}∞n=1, where each Zn is a random
variable on Ω. We often refer to the indices of the process
as “time” indices. We recall that the process {Zn}∞n=1 is
stationary if for any n ∈ Z≥1, its n-fold joint probability
distribution (i.e., the distribution of (Z1, . . . , Zn)) is invariant
to time shifts. Further, {Zn}∞n=1 is exchangeable if for any
n ∈ Z≥1, its n-fold joint distribution is invariant to per-
mutations of the indices 1, . . . , n. It directly follows from
the definitions that an exchangeable process is stationary.
Lastly, the process {Zn}∞n=1 is called a martingale (resp.
supermartingale, submartingale) with respect to the filtration
{Fn}∞n=1 if E[|Zn|] < ∞ and E[Zn+1|Fn] = Zn almost
surely (resp. less than or equal to, greater than or equal to),
for all n. If the inequality is strict, we call the process a strict
supermartingale or strict submartingale. Doob’s martingale
convergence theorem [13] can then be used to show that
{Zn}∞n=1 will have a limit as n grows without bound. Precise
definitions of all notions, including that of ergodicity, can be
found in standard texts (e.g., [13], [14]).
We now recall the classical version of the Polya contagion
process [10], [12]. Consider an urn with R ∈ Z>0 red balls
and B ∈ Z>0 black balls. We denote the total number of balls
by T , i.e., T = R+B. At each time step, a ball is drawn from
the urn. The ball is then returned along with ∆ > 0 balls of
the same color. To describe this process, we use a replacement
matrix MR:
MR =
[
∆ 0
0 ∆
]
,
where [Mr]1,1 = ∆, [Mr]1,2 = 0 means we add ∆ red balls
and 0 black balls when a red ball is drawn, and similarly
[Mr]2,1 = 0, [Mr]2,2 = ∆ means we add 0 red balls and ∆
black balls when a black ball is drawn. and We use an indicator
Zn to denote the color of ball in the nth draw (see Figure 1):
Zn =
{
1 if the nth draw is red
0 if the nth draw is black.
R red
B black
T = R+B
R red
B +∆ black
T = R+B +∆
Z1 = 0
Fig. 1. Illustration of the first draw for a classical Polya process. We drew a
black ball and hence Z1 = 0. Here R = 2, B = 2, and ∆ = 2.
Let Un denote the proportion of red balls in the urn after
the nth draw. Then
Un :=
R+∆
∑n
t=1 Zt
T + n∆
=
ρc + δc
∑n
t=1 Zt
1 + nδc
where ρc =
R
T
is the initial proportion of red balls in the urn
and δc =
∆
T
is a correlation parameter. Since we draw balls
from this urn at each time step, the conditional probability of
drawing a red ball at time n, given Zn−1 = (Z1, . . . , Zn−1),
is given by
P (Zn = 1 | Z
n−1) =
R+∆
∑n−1
t=1 Zt
T + (n− 1)∆
= Un−1.
It can be easily shown that {Un}∞n=1 is a martingale [15].
The process {Zn}∞n=1, whose n-fold joint distribution can be
determined in closed form in terms of the parameters ρc and
δc, is also exchangeable (hence stationary) and non-ergodic
with both Un and the process sample average
1
n
∑n
i=1 Zi
converging almost surely as n → ∞ to a random variable
governed by the Beta distribution with parameters
ρc
δc
and
1−ρc
δc
[15], [16]. The classical Polya process has been applied
in many different contexts, including the modelling of commu-
nication channels with memory [16], image segmentation [17],
as well as in biology, statistics and other areas (see [18]).
III. MODEL DESCRIPTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
A. Network Polya Contagion Process
In this section, we briefly recall the Polya network contagion
process introduced in [1], [2]. Consider an undirected graph
G = (V, E), where V = {1, . . . , N} is the set of N ∈ Z≥1
nodes and E ⊂ V ×V is the set of edges. We assume that G is
connected, i.e. there is a path between any two nodes in G. We
use Ni to denote the set of nodes that are neighbors to node i,
that is Ni = {v ∈ V : (i, v) ∈ E}, and N ′i = {i} ∪ Ni. Each
node i ∈ V is equipped with an urn, initially with Ri ∈ Z>0
red balls and Bi ∈ Z>0 black balls (we do not let Ri = 0 or
Bi = 0 to avoid any degenerate cases). We let Ti = Ri +Bi
be the total number of balls in the ith urn, i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
We use Zi,n as an indicator for the ball drawn for node i at
time n:
Zi,n =
{
1 if the nth draw for node i is red
0 if the nth draw for node i is black.
Thus we define the network contagion process as {Zn}∞n=1,
where Zn = (Zi,n, . . . , ZN,n). However, instead of drawing
solely from its own urn, each node has a “super urn” created
by combining all the balls in its own urn with the balls in its
neighbours’ urns; see Figure 2. This allows the spatial rela-
tionships between nodes to influence their state. This means
that Zi,n is the indicator for a ball drawn from node i’s super
urn, and not its individual urn. Hence, the super urn of node i
initially has R¯i =
∑
j∈N ′
i
Rj red balls, B¯i =
∑
j∈N ′
i
Bj black
3balls, and T¯i =
∑
j∈N ′
i
Tj balls in total, and the network-wide
initial proportion of red balls is ρ =
∑N
i=1
Ri∑
N
i=1
Ti
.
Node 1’s super urn
1
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4
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7
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Node 1’s super urn
Fig. 2. Illustration of a super urn in a network.
We allow the number of added balls to vary based on the
colour drawn, the time index, and the node for which it was
drawn; hence, the replacement matrix for node i at time t is
MR,i(t) =
[
∆r,i(t) 0
0 ∆b,i(t)
]
.
We assume that ∆r,i(t) ≥ 0 and ∆b,i(t) ≥ 0 for all t ∈ Z≥1,
and that there exists i ∈ V and t such that ∆r,i(t)+∆b,i(t) 6=
0; otherwise we are simply sampling with replacement. We
assume throughout that ∆r,i(t) ≥ 0,∆b,i(t) ≥ 0, for all
t ∈ Z≥1 and that there exists i ∈ V and t such that
∆r,i(t) + ∆b,i(t) 6= 0; otherwise we are simply sampling
with replacement. In the context of epidemics, the red and
black balls in an urn, respectively, represent “infection” and
“healthiness”. We refer the interested reader to [2] for a
complete description of this relationship.
To express the proportion of red balls in the individual
urns of the nodes, we define the random vector Un =
(U1,n, . . . , UN,n), where Ui,n is the proportion of red balls
in node i’s urn after the nth draw, i ∈ V . For node i,
Ui,n =
Ri +
∑n
t=1∆r,i(t)Zi,t
Xi,n
,
where
Xi,n = Ti +
n∑
t=1
∆r,i(t)Zi,t +∆b,i(t)(1 − Zi,t) (1)
is the total number of balls in node i’s urn after the nth
draw, and the numerator represents the total number of red
balls in the same urn. We now define the random vector
Sn = (S1,n, . . . , SN,n) as the proportion of red balls in the
super urns of the nodes after the nth draw, so that Si,n is the
proportion of red balls in node i’s super urn after n draws.
Hence, for node i,
Si,n =
R¯i +
∑n
t=1 Z¯r,i,t
X¯i,n
=
∑
j∈N
′
i
Uj,nXj,n
X¯i,n
, (2)
where
Z¯r,i,n =
∑
j∈N ′
i
∆r,j(n)Zj,n,
X¯i,n = T¯i +
n∑
t=1
(Z¯r,i,t + Z¯b,i,t) =
∑
j∈N ′
i
Xj,n,
Z¯b,i,n =
∑
j∈N ′
i
∆b,j(n)(1− Zj,n).
Note that Si,0 = R¯i/T¯i. In fact, Si,n is a function of
the random draw variables of the network, and in par-
ticular of {Znj }j∈N ′i , but for ease of notation, when the
arguments are clear, we write Si,n(Z
n
1 , · · · , Z
n
N) = Si,n.
Then the conditional probability of drawing a red ball
from the super urn of node i at time n given the com-
plete network history, i.e. given all the past n − 1 draw
variables for each node in the network {Zn−1j }
N
j=1 =
{(Z1,1, . . . , Z1,n−1), . . . , (ZN,1, . . . , ZN,n−1)}, satisfies
P
(
Zi,n = 1|{Z
n−1
j }
N
j=1
)
=
R¯i +
∑n−1
t=1 Z¯r,i,n
X¯i,n
= Si,n−1. (3)
That is, the conditional probability of drawing a red ball for
node i given the entire past {Zn−1j }
N
j=1 is the proportion
of red balls in its super urn, Si,n−1. Since these random
variables fully describe the evolution of the process, we
say {Fn}∞n=1 is the natural filtration on {Z
n−1
i }
N
i=1 and by
extension {Ui,n}∞n=1 and {Si,n}
∞
n=1, for all i ∈ V . Thus note
that in (3) we could have instead conditioned on Fn−1.
Using the conditional probability established above, we next
determine the n-fold joint probability of the entire network G.
Let ani ∈ {0, 1}
n, where i ∈ {1, . . . , N}. We have
P
(n)
G (a
n
1 , · · · , a
n
N )
:= P
(
{Zni = a
n
i }
N
i=1
)
=
n∏
t=1
P
(
{Zi,t = ai,t}
N
i=1 | {Z
t−1
i = a
t−1
i }
N
i=1
)
=
n∏
t=1
N∏
i=1
(
Si,t−1
)ai,t(
1− Si,t−1
)1−ai,t
, (4)
where Si,t = Si,t(a
t
1, · · · , a
t
N ) is defined in (3). The study
of the asymptotic behaviour of each node’s contagion process
{Zi,n}∞n=1, i ∈ V is established in [1], [2]. Our objective in
this work is to demonstrate the implications of these results
in designing curing strategies. With the above explicit joint
distribution, it is possible to determine the distributions of
each node’s process. More specifically, using (4), the n-fold
distribution of node i’s process at time t ≥ n is
P
(n)
i,t (ai,t−n+1, · · · , ai,t) :=
∑
a
t−n
i
∈{0,1}t−n
atj∈{0,1}
t,j 6=i
P
(n)
G (a
t
1, · · · , a
t
N ).
It can be shown that the draw contagion process {Zi,n}∞n=1 of
each individual node i is not stationary in general (and hence
4not exchangeable) [1], [2]. Thus the entire network contagion
process {Zn}
∞
n=1 is not stationary.
In order to measure the spread of contagion in the network
at any given time, we wish to see how likely it is, on average,
for a node to be infected at that instant. We thus define the
average infection rate in the network at time n as
I˜n :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
P (Zi,n = 1) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
P
(1)
i,n (1).
Note that I˜n is a function of the network topology (V, E),
the initial placement of balls Ri and Bi, the draw pro-
cesses {Zi,t}nt=1, and number of balls added {∆r,i(t)}
n
t=1
and {∆b,i(t)}nt=1 for each node i ∈ V . Unfortunately for
an arbitrary network, the above quantity does not yield an
exact analytical formula (except in the simple case of complete
networks). As such, in general it is hard to mathematically
analyze the asymptotic behavior of I˜n, which we wish to
minimize when attempting to cure an epidemic. Instead we
examine the asymptotic stochastic behavior of two closely
related variables given by the average individual proportion
of red balls at time n, namely
U˜n :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
Ui,n,
which we call the network susceptibility, and the average
neighborhood proportion of red balls at time n,
S˜n :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
Si,n,
which we call the network exposure.
With the model in hand, we turn to the exploration of a cur-
ing problem. Our objective is to control the average infection
rate I˜n as n grows without bound; but when seeking analytic
results, it might be more amenable to observe the asymptotic
behavior of the network exposure S˜n. These quantities are
closely related; through (2) we see that if Ui,n increases then
this node-specific value causes Sj,n to increase for every
neighbour j of node i, and hence by (3) their conditional
probabilities of drawing red balls increase. More specifically,
↑ Ui,n
(2)
=⇒ ↑ Sj,n for all j ∈ N
′
i
(3)
=⇒ ↑ P
(
Zi,n+1 = 1|{Z
n
j }
N
j=1
)
for all j ∈ N ′i . (5)
Thus if U˜n is high, then this average measure of individual
nodes implies that the conditional probability of a node being
infected is higher on average. Hence U˜n can be understood
as the average node prevalence of infection. The effect of
the network exposure here is more direct, since (3) shows
that S˜n is in fact the network-wide average of the conditional
probabilities of infection, which is a quantity that is intimately
related to the state of infection in the neighbourhood of node
i. Thus S˜n represents the average neighbourhood prevalence
of infection. Note that similarly to I˜n, both U˜n and S˜n are
functions of the network variables.
B. Establishing a Control Problem
The quantities {∆b,i(n)}∞n=1, which denote the net number
of “healthy” balls added to node i’s urn after each draw, can
play the role of “healing or curing parameters”. Our objective
is to show that when these parameters are appropriately
selected, one can steer the average infection rate towards a
desirable level; the selection of curing parameters is, however,
subject to an allowable budget on the maximal number of
healthy balls that can be added in the network. Let us state
this problem formally.
Problem 3.1. (Average Infection Rate Budget Constraint):
Minimize the limiting average infection rate I˜t subject to a
budget B on the total healing at each time step:
min∑N
i=1
∆b,i(t)≤B
∀t
lim sup
t→∞
I˜t
Such optimal curing problems have been studied in many
different contexts [19], [20]. For our model, the solution to
Problem 3.1 would be an infinite horizon optimal control
policy that would yield the best possible level of epidemic
elimination, given the initial data. Finding such a policy in
general appears to be difficult. Nevertheless, as we demon-
strate in the upcoming sections, one can obtain interesting
analytical results regarding the feasibility of this problem, and
design algorithmic strategies to curtail the average infection
rate.
IV. CONTROLLING EPIDEMICS: ANALYTICAL RESULTS
In order to determine when Problem 3.1 makes sense,
we wish to examine when a limit exists. As stated earlier,
working with I˜n can be difficult, and so we instead focus
on the related measures of the network susceptibility U˜n
and network exposure S˜n. Our next results will show how
one can force these measures to form supermartingales by
appropriately selecting the curing policies {∆b,i(n)}∞n=1, for
all i ∈ V . In conjunction with Doob’s martingale convergence
theorem [21], these results show that {Ui,n}∞n=1, {Si,n}
∞
n=1,
and hence both {U˜n}∞n=1 and {S˜n}
∞
n=1, have limits. While
the results presented herein do not obey the per-step budget
constraint on the curing, these results in conjunction with the
simulation results presented later show that strategies that fit
within the framework of Problem 3.1 exist that reduce I˜n on
average.
An important assumption used herein is that the number
of red balls to be added ∆r,i(n) is known at least one step
ahead of time, so that in particular ∆r,i(n) is almost surely
constant given Fn−1. A sufficient, but not necessary, condition
to satisfy this assumption is for {∆r,i(n)}
∞
n=1 to be set, for
all i ∈ V , before the process begins.
Theorem 4.1. (Individual Urn Proportion Categories): In
a general network G = (V, E), if we choose {∆b,i(n)}∞n=1 so
that
∆b,i(n) ≥
∆r,i(n)(1 − Ui,n−1)Si,n−1
Ui,n−1(1 − Si,n−1)
5almost surely for all n ∈ Z≥1 and i ∈ V (resp. equal to,
less than, or equal to) then {Ui,n}
∞
n=1 is a supermartingale
(resp. martingale, submartingale) with respect to the natural
filtration {Fn}∞n=1, i.e.,
E[Ui,n|Fn−1] ≤ Ui,n−1 almost surely ∀n ∈ Z≥1.
Corollary 4.2. (Network Susceptibility Supermartingale):
In a general network G = (V, E), if the curing policies
{∆b,i(t)}∞t=1 obey the bound
∆b,i(n) ≥
∆r,i(n)(1 − Ui,n−1)Si,n−1
Ui,n−1(1− Si,n−1)
almost surely for all nodes i ∈ V , then the network susceptibil-
ity {U˜n}∞n=1, where U˜n =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Ui,n, is a supermartingale
with respect to the natural filtration {Fn}∞n=1, i.e.,
E[U˜n|Fn−1] ≤ U˜n−1 almost surely ∀n ∈ Z≥1.
The proof for Theorem 4.1 is provided in Appendix A.
While Corollary 4.2 is useful, the network exposure S˜n is more
closely related to the average infection rate I˜n than the network
susceptibility U˜n, since our draws are taken from the super urn.
It is with this in mind that we show the next results, which
give us sufficient conditions for {Si,n}∞n=1 and {S˜n}
∞
n=1 to
be supermartingales.
Theorem 4.3. (Super Urn Proportion Categories): In a
general network G = (V, E), if the curing policy {∆b,i(t)}∞t=1
obeys the lower bound
∆b,i(n) > ∆r,i(n)
Si,n−1
1− Si,n−1
max
k s.t. i∈N
′
k
1− Sk,n−1
Sk,n−1
(B1)
almost surely for all nodes i ∈ V , then the neighbourhood
proportions of red balls {Si,n}∞n=1 are strict supermartingales
with respect to the natural filtration {Fn}∞n=1, i.e.
E[Si,n|Fn−1] < Si,n−1 almost surely ∀i ∈ V, n ∈ Z≥1.
Furthermore, if the curing policy {∆b,i(t)}
∞
t=1 obeys the upper
bound
∆b,i(n) < ∆r,i(n)
Si,n−1
1− Si,n−1
min
k s.t. i∈N
′
k
1− Sk,n−1
Sk,n−1
(B2)
almost surely for all nodes i ∈ V , then the neighbourhood
proportions of red balls {Si,n}∞n=1 are strict submartingales
with respect to the natural filtration {Fn}∞n=1.
Corollary 4.4. (Network Exposure Categories): In a general
network G = (V, E), if the curing policies {∆b,i(t)}∞t=1 obey
the lower bound (B1) almost surely for all nodes i ∈ V , then
the network exposure {S˜n}∞n=1, where S˜n =
1
N
∑N
i=1 Si,n, is
a strict supermartingale with respect to the natural filtration
{Fn}
∞
n=1, i.e.,
E[S˜n|Fn−1] < S˜n−1 almost surely ∀n ∈ Z≥1.
Furthermore, if the curing policies {∆b,i(t)}∞t=1 obey the
upper bound (B2) almost surely for all nodes i ∈ V , then
the network exposure {S˜n}∞n=1 is a strict submartingale with
respect to the natural filtration {Fn}∞n=1.
The proof of Theorem 4.3 is presented in Appendix B.
While the duality of these bounds is interesting, in the con-
text of curing we will focus on the lower bound (B1). It
is important to note that the policy for {∆b,i(t)}∞t=1 used
in Theorem 4.3 is not a tight lower bound on the curing
resources which guarantee that the processes {Si,n}∞n=1 are
supermartingales, and hence it is possible that less costly
policies exist that still guarantee this property. In particular,
strategies may exist which obey the fixed budget B on the
amount of curing resources that may be used. However, these
results motivate the fact that the search for better policies
makes sense, since we know that policies exist that will fight
the infection and reduce it on average.
V. CONTROLLING EPIDEMICS: ALGORITHMIC STRATEGIES
The supermartingale results established in the previous
section demonstrate the feasibility of a relaxed version of
Problem 3.1, with no budget limitation. In this section, we
establish numerical methods to find control policies that find
efficient sub-optimal policies for Problem 3.1, under budget
constraints and with having computational complexity in mind.
We compare these strategies with the ones obtained from our
supermartingale results. A summary of all strategies that will
be discussed in this section is given in Table I.
(i) Forcing all Ui,n to be supermartingales (Theorem 4.1):
∆bi,(t) =
∆r,i(n)(1−Ui,n−1)Si,n−1
Ui,n−1(1−Si,n−1)
(ii) Forcing all Si,n to be supermartingales (Theorem 4.3):
∆b,i(t) = ∆r,i(n)
Si,n−1
1−Si,n−1
max
k s.t. i∈N
′
k
1−Sk,n−1
Sk,n−1
(iii) Constrained gradient descent algorithm on a simplex:
Find ∆b,i(t) using Algorithm 2
(iv) Ratio of degree, closeness centrality and super urn proportion:
∆b,i(t) = B
|Ni|CiSi,t−1∑
N
j=1
|Nj |CjSj,t−1
(v) Uniformly allocate the budget to all nodes in the network:
∆b,i(t) =
B
N
TABLE I
CURING STRATEGIES
Before we present these strategies in details, let us describe
briefly how we have evaluated their performance. The simula-
tion platform for these strategies is outlined in Algorithm 1. To
achieve comparable results, independent trials of the process
are ran with the same initial conditions ~R = (R1, . . . , RN ),
~B = (B1, . . . , BN ), and ~∆r = (∆r,1, . . . ,∆r,N), for each
curing strategy. The results for each strategy is then averaged
to evaluate the expected performance. The full simulation
6results, along with discussions of their implications, are pre-
sented in Section VI.
Algorithm 1 Network contagion curing
A← adjacency matrix of the network
~R, ~B, ~∆r ∼ ⌈Uniform((0, 10])⌉
N
B ← budget,
∑N
i=1∆r,i
C ← number of cases, each with a strategy
T ← number of trials to run for each case
K ← number of time steps for each trial
for c = 1 : C do
for t = 1 : T do
~Zc,t ← RUNTRIAL(A, ~R, ~B, ~∆r,B,K, strategy)
~Zc =
1
T
∑T
t=1
~Zc,t
procedure RUNTRIAL(A, ~R, ~B, ~∆r,B,K, strategy)
Initialize Si,0, Ui,0 using Ri and Bi for all i ∈ V
for s = 1 : K do
Assign ∆b,i(s) using strategy, obeying B if required
Generate ~Y ∼ Uniform([0, 1])N
if Yi ≤ Si,s−1 then
Zi,s = 1
else
Zi,s = 0
Update Si,s, Ui,s using ∆r,i, ∆b,i(s) for all i ∈ V
based on A
A. Supermartingale Strategies
The supermartingales results that we have obtained in
Section IV, specifically Theorems 4.1 and 4.3, naturally lead
to a class of curing strategies. In particular, these strategies
guarantee that U˜n and S˜n, respectively, are supermartingales.
It is worth reminding that our theoretical results do not
necessarily imply that average infection rate I˜n forms a
supermartingale. In spite of this, these strategies are still viable
options for curing, as far as enough resources are available.
We next describe the differences between the strategy given
by individual urn proportions, and the one given by super urn
proportions.
By Corollary 4.2, we know that strategy (i) guarantees
that the network susceptibility U˜n will be a supermartingale.
Hence we set the curing strategy for each node so that it
will force its own individual urn proportion of red balls to
be a supermartingale. Since draws are taken form the super
urns and not the individual urns, the relationship between the
reduction of U˜n and I˜n is not a strong one and our simulations
suggests that this strategy does not appear to offer a large
reduction in the average infection rate in general. In contrast,
the curing strategy given by Corollary 4.4, where we choose
our curing strategy to force the super urn proportions of red
balls to be supermartingales for all nodes, performs reasonably
well.
While these strategies guarantee a reduction in their respec-
tive measures, they use an arbitrary amount of curing resources
to do so in general. In fact, as we will see later, these strategies
always use a large amount of curing resources relative to
the impact they have on reducing the average infection rate.
To stay within the framework of Problem 3.1, we will now
examine a numerical curing strategy that obeys a fixed budget
on the per-step curing resources.
B. Gradient Flow Methods
In this section, we employ the well-known gradient descent
algorithm [22] for Problem 3.1. As discussed earlier, using I˜n
as a measure of infection is computationally expensive, and
hence we instead focus on the network exposure S˜n. While
our suggested gradient descent algorithm will not provide the
exact answer to Problem 3.1 for reducing I˜n, we will show
that it is guaranteed to provide the optimal policy to reduce
the closely related measure S˜n.
In Problem 3.1, our curing policy is constrained by a budget
B at each time step and so the feasible set, or set of valid
curing policies, for our gradient descent is all policies which
do not exceed B. However, any optimal policy will make
use of the whole budget, and so we consider our feasible
set to be X =
{
{∆b,i(n)}
N
i=1 ∈ R
N
≥0 |
∑N
i=1∆b,i(n) = B
}
.
Proposition 5.1 shows that for arbitrary initial conditions and
network topologies, the problem under study for E[S˜n|Fn−1]
is convex.
Proposition 5.1. (Gradient descent conditions are met): In
a general network G = (V, E) with arbitrary initial conditions,
the expected network exposure E[S˜n|Fn−1] is convex with
respect to the curing parameters {∆b,i(n)}Ni=1 for all n.
Furthermore, the feasible set
X =
{
{∆b,i(n)}
N
i=1 ∈ R
N
≥0
∣∣∣∣∣
N∑
i=1
∆b,i(n) = B
}
is convex and compact.
The proof for Proposition 5.1 can be found in Appendix C.
The structure of the feasible set X allows us to employ
the simplex constrained gradient descent method, see [22,
Chapter 2]; this procedure is fully described in Algorithm 2.
The complexity of this algorithm which runs at each time
step is O(Nsa), where N is the number of nodes, s is
the number of iterations of the gradient descent, and 1
a
is
the granularity used to find the limit-minimized step size
αk. While Proposition 5.1 guarantees that the curing policy
that this algorithm finds will be optimal for each individual
step, it does not guarantee optimality over the entire time
horizon. In spite of this, as the simulation results in Figure 3
show, this curing strategy still outperforms all other curing
strategies studied in this paper. The downside of the gradient
method is that it is computationally expensive to execute, as
it requires intimate knowledge of the state of all nodes in
the network. This motivates us to seek other methods which
are computationally easier to execute, although they do not
perform as well as the gradient descent strategy.
7Algorithm 2 Constrained gradient descent on a simplex [22]
y1 = (B, 0, . . . , 0)
T ← number of iterations to perform
for k = 1 : T do
i = argminj∈V
∂f
∂xj
[y¯k]i = B, and [y¯k]j = 0 for all j 6= i
αk = argminα∈[0,1] f(yk + α(y¯k − yk))
yk+1 = yk + αk(y¯k − yk)
C. Heuristic Strategies
Both sets of strategies identified above come with chal-
lenges. The supermartingale strategies are accompanied by
analytical results that guarantee that they will improve in
general, but they do not obey a fixed budget, nor do they
create a significant reduction in the average infection rate.
The gradient flow method uses a fixed budget and is provably
optimal to reduce the expected network exposureE[S˜n|Fn−1],
but it is computationally costly and requires a large amount
of information about the state of infection at every node,
including the entire history of draws and values of the curing
parameters. As a compromise between these strategies, we
present the centrality-infection ratio strategy, which is a heuris-
tic centrality-based strategy designed to allocate the fixed per-
step budget B.
The idea is to create a ratio to split the budget between all
nodes in the network, whose time complexity will be of the
order O(1). We consider three factors when determining how
much curing a node should receive: local impact, topological
position, and level of infection. Nodes with higher local impact
have more neighbours, and hence any healing they receive is
immediately distributed to a larger number of nodes. Those
with a better topological position are more centrally located
within the network, in the sense that the distance from them to
all other nodes is smaller. Lastly, nodes with a higher level of
infection will need more curing resources to become healthy.
The resulting curing strategy, which we called the centrality-
infection ratio, is
∆b,i(t) = B
|Ni|CiSi,t−1∑N
j=1 |Nj |CjSj,t−1
.
To measure local impact of node i, we use the degree,
|Ni|, which measures the number of neighbours for node i.
Topological position is determined by calculating the closeness
centrality [23], which, for node i, is defined as
Ci :=
1∑
j∈V d(i, j)
,
where d(i, j) is the length of the shortest path from node i to
node j. Thus Ci will be higher than Cj if node i is closer to all
other nodes than node j, in the sense that the paths from node i
will be shorter in total. Hence Ci gives more importance to the
nodes which are more central, and thus have more influence on
the overall network. Finally, to measure the level of infection,
we use the super urn proportion of red balls Si,n. From (3),
we know that this quantity captures how likely it is for node
i to be infected at this time given the history of the process.
Thus we give more importance to nodes who are more likely
to be infected, so that we may make them less likely to be
infected in the future. This allocation ratio is a generalization
of the best heuristic strategy presented in [1], which only used
the degree to measure centrality.
The advantage of this heuristic strategy is twofold. Not only
does it reduce computational time complexity from O(Nsa)
to O(1), it is also somewhat distributed in the sense that it
does not require constant information from the entire network.
Unlike the gradient descent algorithm, strategy (iv) simply
needs to know information about the network topology and the
state of infection of each node. Since we assume that our net-
work’s graph is constant in time, this topological information
is only required initially and can be used thereafter. The only
other information required from the network at large is the
sum of the super urn ratios
∑N
i=1 Si,n, and hence much less
information needs to be communicated through the network
for the implementation of this strategy.
Lastly, for comparison reasons we present the uniform
curing strategy (v), which splits the budget B equally to all
nodes in the network. This provides a benchmark to measure
the improvement achieved by more intelligent strategies.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In order to confirm the results of Theorems 4.1 and 4.3,
a number of simulations were performed; the pseudocode is
outlined in Algorithm 1. While the simulations performed had
the numbers of red balls added ∆r,i vary between nodes, they
were constant in time. This was done to simplify the choice
of the per-step budget, and does not affect the execution of
the simulations themselves. All initial conditions used in the
simulations herein, as well as videos displaying the average
performance of the curing strategies, are available online.1
A. Simulation setup
The network shown in Figure 3(a) was generated by us-
ing a tool [25] to crawl through 500 posts in a Facebook
group. Individuals who created posts or interacted with others’
content are represented by nodes, while edges are created if
individuals interacted with the post or comment of another
(by commenting on the post, or liking the post or comment).
The resulting graph has 1,363 nodes and 2,425 edges, and by
design represents the topology of a real social network.
We now provide a detailed description of the simulation,
as described in Algorithm 1. The values of Ri, Bi and ∆r,i
were uniformly randomly assigned for each node as integers
between 1 and 10. These values remained consistent for all
strategies and throughout all trials that were performed. Since
the values for ∆r,i were fixed over time, the per-step budget
was set at B =
∑N
i=1∆r,i. With the initial conditions set,
a number of trials were performed for each strategy. Each
trial was performed by successively drawing balls from super
urns for a fixed number of time steps. At time t, we first
1See: http://bit.ly/2szl8PY
8(a) Facebook group network with 1,363 nodes and 2,425 edges.
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Fig. 3. Comparison of all curing strategies presented in Table I. Simulation results were averaged over 250 trials for each strategy, and altogether took
approximately 49 hours on 10 cores of an Intel Xeon processor at 2.20GHz. Initial numbers of balls Ri and Bi, and numbers of red balls added ∆r,i (which
remained constant in time), were uniformly randomly assigned for each node but stayed consistent throughout all trials and strategies, while the assignments
of {∆b,i(t)}
∞
t=1 were different for each strategy. Since the ∆r,i are all constant, the budget was set as B =
∑N
i=1∆r,i.
assigned the curing ∆b,i(t) based on the strategy selected.
Then a uniform random variable on [0, 1], Yi, was generated
for each node i and compared to the super urn proportion.
If Yi < Si,t−1 then we say that a red ball was drawn and
so Zi,t = 1, otherwise we drew black and so Zi,t = 0.
Based on what was drawn, we added ∆r,i red or ∆b,i(t) black
balls into node i’s urn, and hence its super urn and those of
its neighbours. At the end of each trial the draw variables
were saved, and then averaged over all trials to produce the
empirical performance of the curing strategy.
B. Discussion of Simulation Results
The comparisons of all strategies outlined in Section V can
be seen in Figures 3 and 4. It is important to note that only
strategies (iii), (iv) and (v) in Table I have a budget B on the
amount of curing they can use, and the other two strategies
vary the total curing they use in time; the amount of resources
each strategy consumes is shown in Figure 3(c). Figure 3(d)
displays the average wasted curing resources for each strategy,
which we will define later.
Figures 3(b) and 4 compare the performance of all strategies
described in Section V on a Facebook network. Figure 3(b)
includes the gradient flow algorithm, while Figure 4 shows all
other strategies over a longer time horizon. The benchmark
uniform strategy (v) performs the worst, which is to be
expected. Although (iii) is only proven to be optimal for the
expected network exposure E[S˜n|Fn−1], we observe that it is
effective for the average infection rate I˜n as well; as previously
mentioned, this strategy outperforms all other curing strategies
described in this paper. However, the heuristic strategy (iv)
shows similar performance with dramatic improvements in
computational complexity. The supermartingale strategies (i)
and (ii) both reduce I˜n below the initial average infection rate
in the network ρ, but are less effective in doing so than the
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Fig. 4. Plot of empirical average infection rate I˜n on the network shown
in 3(a) for a longer time frame. Strategies used are shown in Table I. The
simulations presented here were performed identically to those described in
Figure 3, with all initial conditions consistent between trials and strategies.
Strategies were averaged over 1,000 trials, and altogether took approximately
30 hours on 12 cores of an Intel Xeon processor at 2.20GHz.
other two methods. Strategy (i) sees only an immediate small
reduction in I˜n, while strategy (ii) continuously decreases I˜n.
This empirical evidence follows (5), and further supports our
assertion that we should focus on the network exposure S˜n to
reduce the average infection rate.
In Figure 3(c) we examine the amount of curing resources
used by each strategy. Since strategies (iii), (iv) and (v) all
obey a per-step budget constraint their usages are fixed. Both
supermartingale strategies, which may use arbitrary amounts
of curing resources, initially use a larger amount of curing
resources and then reduce their usage. This initial expenditure
is the cost required to turn the measures into supermartingales,
after which the strategies only need to maintain the property
which requires less resources. Strategy (i)’s usage appears
to decay exponentially to an almost constant amount, while
strategy (ii) continues to decrease its usage in time. Further,
strategy (i) uses almost 50% more curing resources than the
budget B initially, while strategy (ii)’s initial usage is only
around 18% higher than B. This is likely because (i) is a selfish
strategy; it only considers what is happening on an individual
node level. In contrast, strategy (ii) considers the infection in
local neighbourhoods of nodes, and hence it is more judicious
with its application of resources to specific nodes.
The amount of curing resources wasted by each strategy is
displayed in Figure 3(d). Waste is defined as curing resources
which were assigned to nodes that did not use them since
they displayed “infected” behaviour at that time, and is hence
computed as
∑N
i=1
∑n
t=1∆b,i(t)Zi,t. We observe an intuitive
correlation between the amount of resources wasted and curing
performance: strategies which waste less resources tend to
be more effective at reducing the average infection rate I˜n.
However, this does not tell the full story. The gradient flow
algorithm has several spikes where it wastes more resources
than the centrality-infection ratio (iv), but this does not appear
to affect its curing performance. These likely occur because
the gradient descent tends to focus on clusters of points when
assigning curing, and hence the rest of the network becomes
more imfected. Then, when it switches to another cluster, the
nodes are more infected and hence it wastes more resources
until it sufficiently cures the infection in that cluster. Strategy
(i) initially wastes less than strategy (ii) even though it uses
more curing resources, and it still performs worse with respect
to reduction in I˜n. This suggests that optimal curing strategies
do not simply waste less, but also intelligently allocate their
curing resources to make the best use of them.
Figure 5 shows the initial and final state of infection of
all nodes in a randomly generated network for two different
curing strategies. We define the state of infection for node i at
time t by its individual proportion of red balls Ui,t. Here we
use a small Barabasi-Albert network so the states at the node
level are more visible. Barabasi-Albert networks are randomly
generated through preferential attachment and are widely used
in the literature, as they have been shown to exhibit the
properties of real social networks [24]. In Figure 5(a) we
see that for such a network the centrality-infection ratio (iv)
dramatically outperforms uniform curing (v), as was the case
for the social network shown in Figure 3(a). After 1,000 time
steps, strategy (iv) reduced the average infection rate I˜n to
about 15%, and no node is worse off than it was to begin
with. In contrast, strategy (v) barely reduced I˜n below the
initial average infection rate ρ, and the individual infection
of some nodes rose above 90%. This result illustrates the
fact that intelligent allocation of curing resources is not only
important to reduce the network-wide average infection rate,
but the infection of individual nodes as well.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we examined the problem of curing epidemics
using a network contagion model adapted from the Polya
urn process. We formulated an optimal control problem and
provided analytical results that showed that finding solutions
is a worthwhile endeavour. We used theoretical, numerical and
heuristic curing strategies to attempt to cure the epidemic, and
evaluated their performance using simulations.
Future work with this model could include the statement of
different curing problems. A budget could be assigned over a
finite time horizon instead of on a per-step basis, and strategies
would need to judiciously use this limited supply to reduce
infection as much as possible in the time window. The problem
could even be reversed, so that some desirable healthiness
threshold is provided and one could find the lowest possible
budget that would guarantee that the average infection rate
would be at or below the threshold. Such a problem could be
examined for a per-step or fixed horizon budget.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Theorem 4.1
This result is a generalization of Theorem 4.6 in [2], since
here we allow {∆r,i(t)}∞t=1 to vary in time. As such, some
minor steps are omitted.
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Fig. 5. Comparison of curing strategies (iv) and (v) on a Barabasi-Alberth network [24] with 100 nodes and 99 edges. Here blue represents total healthiness
(Ui,n = 0) while red represents total infection (Ui,n = 1). Simulation results were averaged over 1000 trials for each strategy, and altogether took
approximately 5 minutes on a 4-core Intel Core i7 processor at 2.20 GHz. This simulation was performed identically to those described in Figure 3, with all
initial conditions consistent between trials and strategies.
We will start with the case of a supermartingale. That is,
we wish to show that almost surely for all n ∈ Z≥1,
E[Ui,n | Fn−1]−Ui,n−1 ≤ 0⇔ E[Ui,n−Ui,n−1 | Fn−1] ≤ 0,
since Ui,n−1 is almost surely constant given Fn−1. Take Xi,n
as in (1). We then compute the difference Ui,n − Ui,n−1,
Ui,n − Ui,n−1
=
Ri +
∑n
t=1∆r,i(t)Zi,t
Xi,n
−
Ri +
∑n−1
t=1 ∆r,i(t)Zi,t
Xi,n−1
=
∆r,i(n)Zi,n
Xi,n
−
(Ri +
∑n−1
t=1 ∆r,i(t)Zi,t)(Xi,n −Xi,n−1)
Xi,n−1Xi,n
=
∆r,i(n)Zi,n − Ui,n−1(∆r,i(n)Zi,n +∆b,i(n)(1 − Zi,n))
Xi,n
.
Since Xi,n > 0 almost surely, for all n ∈ Z≥1, it will not
change the sign of the inequality later on, and so we can ignore
it to focus only on the numerator. Thus we wish to check if,
almost surely,
E
[
∆r,i(n)Zi,n − Ui,n−1(∆r,i(n)Zi,n
+∆b,i(n)(1− Zi,n))|Fn−1
]
≤ 0.
Now if the curing policy {∆b,i(n)}∞n=1 for node i satisfies the
bound given:
∆b,i(n) ≥
∆r,i(n)(1 − Ui,n−1)Si,n−1
Ui,n−1(1− Si,n−1)
,
then almost surely,
E
[
∆r,i(n)Zi,n(1− Ui,n−1)− Ui,n−1(1− Zi,n)∆b,i(n)|Fn−1
]
≤ E
[
∆r,i(n)Zi,n(1− Ui,n−1)− Ui,n−1(1− Zi,n)
×
∆r,i(n)(1 − Ui,n−1)Si,n−1
Ui,n−1(1 − Si,n−1)
∣∣∣∣∣Fn−1
]
11
= ∆r,i(n)(1 − Ui,n−1)
[
Si,n−1 − (1− Si,n−1)
Si,n−1
1− Si,n−1
]
= 0,
where the second to last equality comes from the fact that
E[Zi,n|Fn−1] = P (Zi,n = 1|Fn−1) = Si,n−1 almost surely
by (3), and that Si,n−1 is almost surely constant given Fn−1.
Thus as long as ∆b,i(n) obeys this bound almost surely for
all n ∈ Z≥1, {Ui,n}∞n=1 is a supermartingale with respect to
{Zn}∞n=1. Similarly, if ∆b,i(n) is almost surely equal (resp.
less than or equal) to this bound, {Ui,n}
∞
n=1 is a martingale
(resp. submartingale) with respect to {Fn}∞n=1. 
B. Proof of Theorem 4.3
We will focus on the case of a supermartingale, since the
proof for submartingales follows similarly. First, note that
the question of {Si,n}
∞
n=1 being a strict supermartingale is
equivalent to
E[Si,n|Fn−1]− Si,n−1 < 0
where {Fn} is the natural filtration (indeed, we can just
condition on Zn−1). Note, in particular, that E[Zi,t|Fn] = Zi,t
almost surely, for all i ∈ V and t ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and the same
is true for {Si,t}nt=1. Then almost surely, as in Theorem 4.1,
Si,n − Si,n−1 =
Si,n−1(X¯i,n−1 − X¯i,n) + Z¯r,i,n
X¯i,n
.
Since X¯i,n > 0 almost surely for all n ∈ Z≥1 and all i ∈
V , we can ignore it. Further, since Si,n−1 is almost surely
constant, we need to only check if
E
[
Si,n−1(X¯i,n−1 − X¯i,n) + Z¯r,i,n | Fn−1
]
< 0
⇔E
[
(1− Si,n−1)Z¯r,i,n − Si,n−1Z¯b,i,n | Fn−1
]
< 0,
since X¯i,n−1 − X¯i,n = −Z¯r,i,n − Z¯b,i,n. Now let the lower
bound (B1) be satisfied:
∆b,j(n) > ∆r,j(n)
Sj,n−1
1− Sj,n−1
max
k s.t. j∈N
′
k
1− Sk,n−1
Sk,n−1
.
Notice E[Zj,n|Fn−1] = Sj,n−1 almost surely, so we have
E
[
Si,n−1(X¯i,n−1 − X¯i,n) + Z¯r,i,n | Fn−1
]
< E
[
(1− Si,n−1)Z¯r,i,n − Si,n−1
∑
j∈N ′
i
∆r,j(n)
Sj,n−1
1− Sj,n−1
× max
k s.t. j∈N
′
k
1− Sk,n−1
Sk,n−1
(1 − Zj,n)
∣∣∣∣∣Fn−1
]
=
∑
j∈N ′
i
∆r,j(n)Sj,n−1(1− Si,n−1)−∆r,j(n)
Sj,n−1
1− Sj,n−1
× Si,n−1 max
k s.t. j∈N
′
k
1− Sk,n−1
Sk,n−1
(1 − Sj,n−1)
=
∑
j∈N ′
i
∆r,j(n)Sj,n−1
[
1− Si,n−1
(
1 + max
k s.t. j∈N
′
k
1− Sk,n−1
Sk,n−1
)]
=
∑
j∈N ′
i
∆r,j(n)Sj,n−1
[
1−
Si,n−1
mink s.t. j∈N ′
k
Sk,n−1
]
.
Now note that j ∈ N ′i and hence, in particular,
min
k s.t. j∈N
′
k
Sk,n−1 ≤ Si,n−1 almost surely, and all other
quantities are non-negative. Thus, with our value of ∆b,j(n)
for all j ∈ N ′i , we have almost surely
E
[
Si,n−1(X¯i,n−1 − X¯i,n) + Z¯i,n | Fn−1
]
<
∑
j∈N ′
i
∆r,j(n)Sj,n−1
[
1−
Si,n−1
min
k s.t. j∈N
′
k
Sk,n−1
]
≤ 0.
Thus, for any i ∈ V , if {∆b,i(n)}∞n=1 obeys the lower
bound (B1) almost surely, the neighbourhood proportion of
red balls {Si,n}∞n=1 is a strict supermartingale.
For the case of a strict submartingale, notice if the upper
bound (B2) is satisfied:
∆b,j(n) < ∆r,j(n)
Sj,n−1
1− Sj,n−1
min
k s.t. j∈N
′
k
1− Sk,n−1
Sk,n−1
,
then similarly to the case of a supermartingale,
E
[
Si,n−1(X¯i,n−1 − X¯i,n) + Z¯i,n | Fn−1
]
> E
[
(1− Si,n−1)Z¯r,i,n − Si,n−1
∑
j∈N ′
i
∆r,j(n)
Sj,n−1
1− Sj,n−1
× min
k s.t. j∈N
′
k
1− Sk,n−1
Sk,n−1
(1 − Zj,n)
∣∣∣∣∣Fn−1
]
=
∑
j∈N ′
i
∆r,j(n)Sj,n−1
[
1−
Si,n−1
max
k s.t. j∈N
′
k
Sk,n−1
]
≥ 0,
since maxk s.t. j∈N ′
k
Sk,n−1 ≥ Si,n−1 almost surely. Thus if
{∆b,i(n)}∞n=1 obeys the upper bound (B2) almost surely, the
neighbourhood proportion of red balls {Si,n}∞n=1 is a strict
submartingale. 
C. Proof of Proposition 5.1
First note that as a function of the parameters x =
(∆b,1(n), . . . ,∆b,N (n)), E[S˜n|Fn−1] is of the form fn(x) =
1
N
∑N
i=1
ci
di+σi(x)
, where from (2), we can see that
ci = R¯i +∆r,j(n)E[Zj,n|Fn−1] +
n−1∑
t=1
Z¯r,i,t,
di = ci + B¯i +
n−1∑
t=1
Z¯b,i,t, and
σi(x) =
∑
j∈N ′
i
xj(1 − E[Zj,n|Fn−1]).
Note that some of the variables in the right hand side of the
last equation are random, but are almost surely constant given
Fn−1. We thus need to show that, for x, y ∈ R
N
≥0, λ ∈ [0, 1],
fn (λx + (1− λ)y) ≤ λfn(x) + (1− λ)fn(y).
12
Note σi(x) is linear in x. Moreover,
fn (λx+ (1 − λ)y)− λfn(x) − (1− λ)fn(y)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
ci
di + σi(λx + (1− λ)y)
−
λci
di + σi(x)
−
(1− λ)ci
di + σi(y)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
ciλ(λ − 1)(σi(x) − σi(y))2
(di + σi(λx + (1− λ)y))(di + σi(x))(di + σi(y))
≤ 0,
since λ − 1 ≤ 0 and all other terms are nonnegative. As
a result, E[S˜n|Fn−1] is convex in the curing parameters
(∆b,1(n), . . . ,∆b,N (n)) for all time. Lastly, the constraint
set
{
{∆b,i(n)}Ni=1 ∈ R
N
≥0 |
∑N
i=1∆b,i(n) = B
}
is clearly a
finite-dimensional simplex and hence convex and compact.
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